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ABSTRACT
In the early 1960's a group of economists proposed to the Bureau
of the Budget the creation of a computerized national statistical
data center as an attempt at improving the efficiency of federal
statistical operations.
After an examination by the Bureau of the Budget and with the
publication of its own report on the data center concept, the issue
attracted widespread public concern with regard to its possible vio-
lation of personal privacy rights. A series of Congressional investi-
gations and the ensuing public criticism of the concept successfully
stopped its implementation.
This paper examines the history of this issue with special
attention to the differing perspectives of the executive and the
legislative branches of the federal government in examining and
evaluating the proposal for a national data center.
Thesis Supervisor. Ted Greenwood
Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political
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PREFACE
Unless otherwise referenced, the information contained in this
paper was derived from a series of interviews with the following
individuals who were involved in the data center issue: Richard
Ruggles, Edgar Dunn, Guy Orcutt, Ed Goldfield, Richard Tayber, Morris
Hansen, Charles Zwich, and Charles Schultze.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Among the more impressive accomplishments of the past few dec-
ades has been the remarkable evolution of technology related to the
storage, processing, and transmittal of information. The transi-
tion from manual to computerized information systems has resulted
in an expansion of data processing capabilities whose dimensions are
without parallel in the history of technological development. The
rapidity and scope of the transition far outstrips the shift from
chemical to nuclear energy, and in a society where information is, in
John McCarthy's words, "a commodity no less tangible than energy, and
even more pervasive in human affairs,"1 the consequences are likely
to be equally significant.
We are currently witnessing the beginning of a process in
which all types of records, public and private, are being converted
to computer readable format, and it is likely that within the next
few decades virtually all of the world's recorded information will
be available in digital form. While the efficiency and economic
advantages of this trend are enormous, its impact on human liberties
and desires is not yet clearly perceived.
One of the earliest important debates regarding this potential
conflict took place in the early 1960's over the proposals for the
establishment of a national statistical data center. This paper
?
examines the evolution of these proposals, their evolution and sub-
sequent rejection, within the executive and legislative branches of
the federal government. The objective was to determine how one of
the first major repudiations by the federal government of technologi-
cal advance came about.
CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL REVIEW
The first step toward the formulation of proposals for the crea-
tion of a national data center came as the second part of a dual pro-
posal submitted to the American Economic Association by the Ford
Foundation. In its proposal the Foundation offered to fund two acti-
vities: the first was the establishment of a journal of abstracts of
current economic literature; the second was the formation of a user
oriented group which would act to communicate the data and data base
requirements of the economics community to the federal government.
The proposals evolved from a concern on the part of the Foundation
with the progress of economic research, and specifically from the work
of Dr. Richard Ruggles, a consultant to the Foundation and head of the
Economics Department of Yale University, whose principal responsibility
at Ford was the identification of problem areas relating to such re-
search. Ruggles defined two areas which, at the time, represented
major concerns to economists: the first was the communications prob-
lem arising from the proliferation of economic literature and periodi-
cals; the second was the growing dissatisfaction of economists with the
quality and availability of basic statistical data compiled by the fed-
eral government -- hence the proposals to the AEA.
The AEA accepted the first part of the Ford offer and the Journal
of Economic Abstracts (now the Journal of Economic Literature) was cre-
ated. With regard to the second part, the AEA's own organizational
structure prevented its addressing in any substantive fashion the issues
involved. It therefore sought the assistance of the Social Science
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Research Council in establishing a committee to study the problems as-
sociated with the use of economic data and to undertake any program of
action which might seem appropriate.2
Accordingly, in December 1960, Henry Regan, then president of
the SSRC, arranged an exploratory discussion of the problems of data
use in the social sciences, drawing on social scientists from the uni-
versities and the federal government. This discussion revealed that al-
though there were large areas of common interest among the various so-
cial sciences, there were also wide differences in approach and concern
when specific aspects of data use were considered. As a consequence,
the scope of the discussions was narrowed to the initial concern of
the AEA and the Ford Foundation with the problems of economic data.
To investigate these in greater detail Dr. Ruggles was asked
to appoint and chair a special committee on the preservation and use
of economic data. He chose four other academic economists to complete
the committee.3 As the focus of the committee's efforts was to be on
data collected and maintained by the federal government, all five indi-
viduals were well acquainted with the work of the federal statistical
system and were also involved with research activities requiring large
bodies of statistical data.
At the outset the committee chose to focus on areas which could
yield the most valuable research material per unit cost and thus direc-
ted its attention to those bodies of data which were available in ma-
chine readable format. The two principal concerns of the committee were
the dissemination and preservation policies of the federal government
with respect to this data. 10
During 1962 to 1965, the committee undertook to study on an
agency-by-agency basis the problems relating to the preservation of, and
access to, specific bodies of information. Meetings were held with
a considerable number of agencies in the Departments of Commerce, La-
bor, Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, and Health, Education, and Wel-
fare. In addition the committee kept close contact with the Bureau
of the Budget, the National Archives, and the National Science Founda-
tion. In April of 1965, the committee submitted its final report to
the Social Science Research Council. In essence it concluded that
the growing decentralization of the federal statistical system was
increasingly hampering the effective utilization of government statis-
tics.5 In particular it cited the following major problems as arising
from the existing decentralization system:6
Preservation of Data. Under a decentralized system it is extreme-
ly difficult to maintain a coherent and consistant policy with
respect to the preservation of basic data. Where various agen-
cies are primarily responsible for day-to-day operations, they
frequently do not, or cannot, give high priority to long-run con-
siderations. Thus, there is no adequate mechanism for insuring
that these agencies are following optimal policies with respect
to the preservation of important data.
Data Access. Owing to the decentralized nature of the federal
statistical system, it is extremely difficult for potential data
users outside the federal system, or even other federal agencies,
to discover precisely what data tapes exist and the procedures for
gaining access to them. Moreover, as the production of data is
an activity ancillary to the primary responsibilities of most
federal agencies, they find it both inconvenient and costly to
respond to requests for specific information which might disrupt
their normal operations.
Development of Usable Data. Under the present decentralized
system emphasis is placed on the development of specific tabula-
tions or computations relevant to the operations of the agency
producing the data. Thus supporting and explanatory data relevant
to these final tabulations, which might make the data useful to
other agencies, is often not prepared or made available in a
clean edited form. The value of the data is thus restricted to
the producing agency.
Disclosures. In addition to the problems of locating and gaining
physical access to the data, a considerable portion of the data
obtained by the federal government from individuals and firms is
done so with the understanding that it will be considered confi-
dential and not available to those outside the government or even
other federal agencies. While all concerned have recognized
that no federal agency ought to violate this confidentiality,
agencies often do provide outsiders with statistical summaries
of specific data in such a way that individuals cannot be identi-
fied. However, with the exception of the IRS and the Census Bu-
reau, few federal agencies have the manpower or funds to provide
users with such services. Moreover, restrictions on interagency
disclosures preclude the performance of many interesting correla-
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tions of data prior to the publication of statistical summaries.
In response to these perceived difficiencies the Ruggles committee
suggested greater centralization on the part of both the users' com-
munity and the federal statistical system. Specifically, the committee
offered three recommendations:7
1) The Bureau of the Budget, in view of its responsibility for
the federal statistical program, should immediately take steps
to establish a National Data Center.
2) The Office of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of the Bud-
get should institute programs to insure the systematic preserva-
tion in usable form of improtant data by those agencies engaging
in statistical programs.
3) At an early date the Social Science Research Council should
convene representatives from research institutions and universities
in order to develop an organization which can provide a clearing
house and coordination of requests for data made by scholars from
federal agencies.
The data center suggested by the Ruggles group would have as its
primary objective the provision of basic data regarding the American
economy to individual users or other federal agencies in whatever for-
mat they desired within the bounds of a single, coherent discloser po-
licy. It would also provide, on a reimbursable basis, production runs
and aggregated tapes and results to scholars, thereby eliminating inter-
agency disclosure problems. It would thus serve a role similar to that
13
of the Library of Congress providing systematic and comprehensive cover-
age of data in its area of competency. In order to carry out its func-
tion it would necessarily have both substantial computer facilities of
its own and interagency authority to obtain basic data in machine read-
able format from any federal agency engaged in statistical operations.
The Center could thus collect whatever data might be relevant to its
operations and:
- catalog and make known to the user community the full range of
available data,
- develop consistent policies regarding the preservation of impor-
tant data,
- enforce uniform access and disclosure procedures, and
- make the fullest use of available data with carefully designed
file maintenance and documentation procedures.
The Ruggles committee urged the Bureau of the Budget to take the
initiative in promoting the establishment of the National Data Center.
Charles Schultze, director of BoB at the time, proved receptive to the
committee's suggestions, and at the urging of his office, Raymond Bowman,
then head of the office of Statistical Standards, commissioned a second
study of the issues raised by the Ruggles report. To conduct the study,
Bowman chose Dr. Edgar Dunn, a consultant with Resources for the Future
and formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs,
known within the federal statistical community for his initiation of im-
portant statistical reforms within the Census Department.8
The Dunn report was completed in approximately six months of part-
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time effort by Dr. Dunn and an informal five-man advisory committee and
was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget in November of 1965.9 This
report concurred fully with the Ruggles committee's assessments of the
problems of the federal statistical system, noting also in passing
that concern with the statistical system extended beyond the academic
social science research community, encompassing among others numerous
federal agencies such as the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Urban Affairs,
etc., all experiencing great difficulties in assembling the statistical
data to guide them in analyzing their missions, establishing performance
standards, and supporting administrative decisions and the evaluation
of results.
Beyond these arguments for the necessity of some form of action,
Dunn focused on specific considerations relating to the implementation
of a National Data Center. He began by taking exception to the term
"National Data Center" on the grounds that it suggested an overly super-
ficial approach to the statistical problem and proposed instead the crea-
tion of a National Data Service Center, chosing the term carefully to
emphasize the service and coordinating functions of the proposed facility
and to differentiate his concept from that of a simple computerized data
file.1 0 Dunn saw neither a pressing requirement for nor any advantage
deriving from the centralization of federal statistical files (with the
exception of those with archival value which might not ordinarily be
preserved by the agencies which originally developed them). Instead, he
was the solution to the problems of the statistical system in terms of
the promulgation throughout the system of uniform standards of file
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design and maintenance in order to insure maximum file capability.
Specifically, Dunn felt the major deficiency of the federal statis-
tical system was the difficulty in associating-records obtained from
different statistical files, thus precluding the identification and exam-
ination of many interesting interrelationships. At the heart of the
problem was the incompatibility of file structures, i.e. different
formatting or classification schemes used by different agencies. The
physical centralization of incompatible files would serve little use-
ful purpose, and the crucial requirement was a mechanism for the assur-
ance of interagency file compatibility. Having achieved such compati-
bility, the compactness and portability of magnetic tape data storage
would eliminate the need for physical centralization of any but the
most frequently used data files.11
However, this important distinction between the Ruggles and Dunn
perspectives later tended to be obscured, in part because both reports
considered a broader range of issues than just file centralization but
primarily because Dunn also recommended the creation of a data center,
albeit one of limited scope intended to hold only those files which
either were of considerable archival value or which were likely to be
used very frequently in the course of performing user requested analysis.
To this end, the report contained in one of its appendices a listing of
9,000 computer tapes which might be used to form the core of such a
center.12 While Dunn later explained that the centralization of these
tapes was proposed only so that they might be preserved until it could
be determined which were of sufficient value to include in an operation-
al center,13 this point was not made sufficiently clear in the initial
16
report, and as a consequence the 9,000 tapes were interpreted as only
the first step in the compilation of a much more massive data center.14
Dunn thus came to be identified with Ruggles as an advocate of a massive
National Data Center.
Nonetheless, the distinction between Dunn's view and his own
was not lost on Ruggles who was committed to the large scale centraliza-
tion of the federal statistical files. He therefore sought support for
his position and was able to persuade Charles Schutze to appoint a
third commission, under the direction of Carl Kaysen, a Harvard econo-
mist known by Ruggles to be sympathetic to his views, to further investi-
gate the statistical system.1 5 Kaysen subsequently appointed five econo-
mists -- including Dr. Ruggles -- to form the Task Force on the Storage
of and Access to Government Statistics.16
While the task force went about its work, Congressional interest
developed in the data center question. The issue was first brought be-
fore Congress with the testimony of Edgar Dunn before the Senate Sub-
committee on the Judiciary, chaired by Senator Long of Missouri.
The overall topic of the subcommittee's investigation was the invasion
of privacy, with interest being principally focused on the increasing
use of electronic surveillence devices, especially by the government on
its own employees. While the data bank may have been relevant to its
proceedings, the committee's interest was, at the time, peripheral
as it called only a single witness (Dr. Dunn) to testify before it.
Nonetheless, the subcommittee's interest did serve to spread discussion
of the issue outside the bounds of the federal statistical community and
led to further discussion of the proposals both within Congress and by
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the public.
The Senate Subcommittee's hearings were held in June of 1966;
a month later the data center was considered in greater detail during
two days of hearings by a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, chaired by Cornelius Gallagher of New Jersey.18
Gallagher had, along with Senators Long and Ervin, a reputation
as being among the staunchest advocates of personal privacy rights with-
in the Congress.19 Having recently concluded a series of investigations
regarding the use of personality tests by federal agencies,20 he turned
his attention to other trends within the government which he perceived
as constituting possible threats to personal privacy, coming to focus
on the data bank proposal. The Congressman expressed concern that the
Budget Bureau in its desire to improve the efficiency of government oper-
ations had failed to give adequate consideration to the implications
of such a proposal in terms of potential privacy intrusions. What he
sought was the creation of "a climate of concern, in the hope that guide-
lines can be set up which will protect the confidentiality of reports
and prevent the invasion of privacy, while at the same time allowing
government to function more efficiently and facilitating the necessary
research of scholars in statistical analysis." 2 1
Despite Gallagher's expressed concern for the necessity of a
balanced perspective, his own view, and the tone the hearings would
subsequently take, was evidenced in remarks such as the following:22
The presence of these records in government files is frightening
enough, but the thought of them neatly bundled together into one
compact package is appalling. We cannot be certain that such dos-
siers would always be used for benevolent purposes.... The possible
future storage and regrouping of such personal information also
strikes at the core of our Judeo-Christian concept of "forgive and
forget," because the computer neither forgives nor forgets...such
power would enable a less scrupulous person -- or even a well
meaning but overzealous government official -- to delve behind
the statistic to the respondant and learn the inner secrets of
the individual.
A series of witnesses from the academic world, the government, and the
legal profession, called before the committee to offer their views,
tended on the whole (with the exception of witnesses for the Bureau of
the Budget) to reflect Gallagher's perspective, expressing serious re-
servations regarding the successful implementation of the proposed
23
data center without substantial intrusions on personal privacy.
For its part, the Budget Bureau had largely failed to antici-
pate the extent of the emotional reaction that the proposition evoked.24
The privacy issue which cane to be the focus of Congressional and pub-
lic concern had been virtually ignored in the reports and discussions
within the executive branch. This is not to say that the proponents
of the data center were unaware of the privacy implications, but the
implicit assumption had been that privacy, which had been very well
protected by the administrative procedures of executive organizations
such as the Census Bureau, could be protected equally well in a data
center operating under the same procedures.25 However, both the
Gallagher Committee and later the public press viewed the ommission of
explicit discussions of privacy in the Ruggles and Dunn reports as indi-
cations of a lack of serious concern for the issue within the executive
branch.
Thus while the BoB reports, and to a large extent, its testimony
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before Congress tried to focus on improving the efficiency of the
federal statistical system, Gallagher and the press directed their con-
cern to the possible Orwellian implications of the proposal. Gallagher
saw the threat of a computerized man, stripped of his individuality;
the press saw in the center the beginings of a police state -- a com-
puterized Gestapo.26
The impact of the near unanimous press condemnation coupled with
Congressional pressure was sufficient to halt any further consideration
of the program. The concept itself was, at the time of the hearings,
in a sufficiently embrionic stage that it had not attracted either the
attention or the support of any but a few members of the executive
branch whose commitment was half-hearted at best.27 Thus for all prac-
tical purposes the concept died with the Gallagher hearings and the en-
suing publicity in the autumn of 1966. The submission of the Kaysen
report in October of that year, again advocating a data center, revived
the issue briefly but a number of factors contributed to prevent any
renewed push.28 Magazine articles and editorials in the press remained
critical of any attempt to centralize government data, and Congress
maintained its own pressure on the Bureau of the Budget with two sets
of hearings before Senator Long's Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure in March of 1967 and February of 1968.29 With the
worsening of the Vietnam War in late 1967 and the general demoralization
of the federal bureaucracy that followed little enthusiasm could be gen-
erated within the Bureau of the Budget for marshalling the time or re-
sources necessary to adequately respond to Congressional pressure on the
data bank. The election of a new administration in 1968, with a clear
20
philosophy against government centralization, effectively shelved any
further consideration of the issue.
CHAPTER III: ISSUES WITHIN THE EXECUITVE BRANCH
Definitions
The movement for a National Data, Center was the product of a
growing concern on the part of a certain class of data users with the
efficacy of the federal statistical system. It is worthwhile at the
outset, therefore, to distinguish between statistical and other types
of data gathered on individuals since the recognition of these distinc-
tions had a bearing on the perspectives that various groups brought
to the examination of the data center issue. Westin defines three
types of records pertaining to individuals:30
Administrative Records. The administrative record is often
generated in the process of a transaction -- marriage, graduation,
obtaining a license or permit, buying on credit, or investing
money. Usually a record that refers to an individual includes
an address or other data sufficient for identification. Personal
data in an administrative record tends to be self-reported or
gathered through open inspection of the subject's affairs. Pri-
vate firms usually treat administrative records pertaining to
individuals as proprietary information, while administrative
records held by the government are normally accessible to the
public and may be shared for administrative purposes among var-
ious agencies. Administrative records sometimes serve as cre-
dentials for an individual; birth certificates, naturalization
22
papers, bank records, and diplomas all serve to define a per-
son's status.
Intelligence Records. The intelligence record may take a variety
of forms. Familiar examples are the security clearance file,
the police investigative file, and the consumer credit report.
Some of the information in an intelligence record may be drawn
from administrative records, but much of it is the testimony
of informants and the observations of investigators. Intelli-
gence records tend to circulate among intelligence-gathering
organizations and to be shared selectively with organizations
that make administrative determinations about individuals, such
as the granting of employment or security clearance. Intelli-
gence records are seldom deliberately made publid, except as
evidence in legal proceedings. The largest categories of intelli-
gence files are those maintained by law enforcement agencies,
principally on the federal and local levels.
Statistical Records. A statistical record is typically created
in a population census or sample survey. The data is usually
gathered through a questionnaire or by some other method designed
to assure the comparability of individual responses. In nearly
all cases, the identity of the record subject is eventually
separated from the data in the record. If a survey must follow
a given individual for a long time, his identity is often encoded,
with the key to the code entrusted to a separate record to guard
anonymity. Data from administrative records are sometimes used
for statistical purposes, but statistical records about identifi-
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able individuals are not used for administrative or intelligence
purposes. Thus Internal Revenue Service records and Census
Bureau records contain information on individuals; however,
only statistical summaries of such information -- in which indi-
viduals cannot be identified -- are ever released.
Not every type of record or data can be fit unambiguously into
one of these three categories. Statistical records are sometimes
derived from administrative files and do at times contain sensitive
information. Nonetheless, these are viable distinctions. Those engaged
in the production and maintenance of data files have, in general, lit-
tle difficulty in categorizing the data they handle as either adminis-
trative, intelligence, or statistical. Moreover, tradition dictates
that the three types of records should be held separately, and each
used for its nominal purpose only.31 The transfer of data from one
type of record to another takes place only under controlled conditions.
These procedures and distinctions were implicit in the thinking
of the proponents of the data center. Neither they, nor other members
of the federal statistical community ever envisated the mass trans-
fer of data from administrative and intelligence files into a national
statistical data center. This was, however, precisely the image formed
by many outside the statistical community who were unfamiliar with its
traditions, and the failure of the center's proponents to sufficiently
delineate before Congress and the public the scope of these traditions
contributed enormously to the criticisms the data center proposals en-
countered.32
The Federal Statistical System and the Movements for Reform
The movement for a national data center was only the latest in
a long series of commissions and studies, dating from 1844, directed
at improving the efficacy of the federal statistical system, and many
of the concerns and recommendations voiced by Ruggles, Dunn, and Kaysen
represented more or less perennial comments.33
Inefficiency stemming from decentralization and subsequent dupli-
cation of effort has always been a popular complaint, and increased
centralization is usually the proposed solution. The first movement
toward centralization and coordination of effort took place with the
creation by Congress of a Bureau of Statistics within the Treasury
Department in 1866. In part this action was the result of the first
Congressional study of the federal statistical system commissioned
by the House of Representatives in 1844.
In 1903, the transfer of the Bureau of Statistics to the newly
created Department of Commerce and Labor resulted in the immediate
appointment by the Secretary of a special commission to consider the
reorganization of statistical work within the department. The recom-
mendations of the commission calling for increased centralization of
statistical activities were not carried out, nor were the similar
recommendations that were presented to the Secretary's successor in
1908 by another special commission.
By 1918, the war effort had resulted in a new emphasis on effi-
ciency and centralization. The Central Bureau of Planning and Statis-
tics had been established to review and consolidate forms, build up an
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index of all data collections by the government and promote standar-
dized classifications. Its functions were subsequently taken over by
the Bureau of Efficiency in 1919, when that agency was asked by Con-
gress to undertake a thorough review of the federal statistical sys-
tem. Completed in 1922, the review recommended a reorganization of
statistical operations to concentrate, as far as possible, collection,
compilation, and dissemination of all nonadministrative statistics in
a contral bureau because under the present system
1) user access was difficult,
2) uncoordinated surveys were burdensome to respondents, and
3) cost was excessive.
No action was taken on the report.
In 1933, the funding of the government statistical program was
jeopardized by reductions in federal expenditures. As a consequence
the American Statistical Association and the Social Science Research
Council combined to form the Committee on Government Statistics and
Information (COGSIS) to advise government on organizational matters
with respect to the statistical system. Although not established un-
til mid-June of 1933, it was able to recommend the creation of a
Central Statistical Board by July 1933, and see it established within
a matter of weeks by executive order. COGSIS urged the expansion of
the Central Statistical Board as a coordinating agency, but with only
advisory power and not the authority to command agencies to act. In
1940, the Central Statistical Board was converted into the Division
of Statistical Standards and placed within the Budget Bureau (the con-
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version involved no major change in function or powers). The powers
of the Statistical Division were expanded somewhat during the war
effort when paperwork burdens being placed on manufacturers resulted
in the Federal Reports Act of 1942 which gave the Division four powers:
1) To forbid the use of overly complex forms,
2) To designate a specific agency to perform specific work,
3) To forbid agencies to collect unnecessary information (the
definition of unnecessary was left to BoB), and
4) To force agencies to divulge information they had gathered
to other agencies.
In 1948, as part of the overall work of the first Hoover Commis-
sion, the National Bureau of Economic Research was asked to produce
a report on the statistical system of the federal government. The re-
port,authored by F. C. Mills and Clarence Long,noted the following as
some of the problems of the existing systems:
- Overlapping jurisdiction of agencies
- Lack of balance in resources allocation
- Lack of comparability of data from different sources
- Variations in quality
- Poor means of access by users
- Gaps in coverage of some areas
- Methodological blunders
- Publication time and adequacy shortcomings
As with previous reports greater centralization was urged as a means
2?
for overcoming these difficulties. Mills and Long also recommended
an expansion of the powers of the Division of Statistical Standards
to enable it to better carry out its coordinating responsibilities and
increase the overall efficiency of the statistical system. As a con-
swquence, Congress, in 1950, did further expand the authority of the
Division of Statistical Standards to develop programs and issue orders
for improving the statistical activities of the executive branch.
But immediately following the Korean War, the staff of the Division
was cut from sixty to fewer than forty. With the reduced manpower
level, the Division was never able to pursue its coordinating activities
very vigorously.
However, with respect to the centralization of operational acti-
vities, the Mills-Long recommendation, like the 100 years of similar
recommendations which preceded it, had little impact. In fact, the
trend in the federal statistical system has been, especially in recent
years, one of growing decentralization. In 1934, the three major sta-
tistical agencies within the federal government, the Census Bureau,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Department of Agriculture
(which contains the Economic Research Service and the Statistical
Reporting Service), accounted for 92% of federal expenditures on major
statistical programs. At the writing of the Mills-Long report, their
share was 78%, and at the writing of the Kaysen report in 1966, it would
be 60%.3 (The table on the following page lists the expenditures for
selected years of some of the major federal statistical agencies.35 )
The trend toward a decentralized statistical system in spite of
continued recommendations for increased centralization is the product
28
TABLE 1 OBLIGATIONS FOR PRINCIPAL STATISTICAL PROGRAMS,
SELECTED YEARS, 1934-1971
Title of Agency or Series
Total obligations -- all
principal stat. programs
Periodic Census -type pro-
grams-annual coverage
Current programs-total
Bureau of the Census
Statistical Reporting
Service and part Economic
Research Service (Agric.)
Bureau of Labor Statistics
National Center for Edu-
cational Statistics
National Center for Health
Statistics
Bureau of Mines
Office of Business Economics
Social Security Admin-
istration
Social and Rehabilita-
tion Service
Department of Housing
and Urban Development
Department of Transporta-
tion
Internal Revenue Service
Interstate Commerce Com-
mission
Office of Equal Oppor-
tunity
Fiscal
1929
10.6 15.7
5.1
5.5
2.4
1.7
.6
5.1
10.6
2.1
3.8
2.1
.2 .3
- .3
Years (millions of dollars)
30.7
7.5
23.2
7.4
4.9
4.3
1.0
.7
1.1
.8 1.2
.5 1.1
67.2 221.3
.7 1.2
1961 1971(est)
18.8
48.4
9.6
9.8
11.1
30.0
188.3
22.6
23.4
26.4
.9 5.7
4.0
2.0
1.5
2.6
3.1
10.1
3.6
4.0
13.4
4.9
3.0
5.7
8.0
.7
4.9
TABLE 1 (cont.)
Fiscal Years (millions of dollars)
Title of Agency or Series
Other agencies
Other associated statisti-
cal series: Statistical
Policy Division
3 i2 2 1961
.7 2.6
.125 .373 .457 2.711
Totals may not add because of rounding.
19'71(est)
51.9
of a number of factors. First of all, the commissions and study
groups examining the statistical system tended to suboptimize. That
is, they focused less on the difficult questions of what data the
government ought to be obtaining and supplying users, than on how
existing services might be expanded with only marginal cost increase.
This approach overlooks the fact that the implementation and adminis-
tration of new government programs frequently requires the compilation
of whole new classes of data which are unavailable on existing records.
As a consequence a new data gathering activity is established and is
usually incorporated within the structure of the agency charged with
the overall administration of the program in question. The prolifer-
ation of government social programs -- and the subsequent require-
ment of statistical data for the administration and evaluation of those
programs -- thus significantly contributed to the decentralization
of the statistical system. Sugsequent attempts to divorse these
statistical activities from their parent agencies and bring them under
a single centralized operation encountered the charge that in so doing
they would be less responsive to the original parent group and thus
fail to perform with optimal efficiency the task for which they were
created.
Beyond this, charges of inefficiency in the federal statistical
system tended to be discounted by the members of that community.
While potential improvements could always be identified, the statisti-
cal community could justifiably feel that U.S. government statistics
were of the highest quality to be found anywhere in the world. Inno-
vations in methodology and processing were adopted without unreasonable
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lags and occasionally were developed by the statistical services them-
selves. Moreover, the calls for centralization were seen by many as
less the result of identifiable system failure than the natural pro-
clivity of the human intellect toward "orderliness". That is, a
decentralized system is seen as "disorderly" to the casual observer
while a centralized system is orderly and efficient.
Given this background, it is not surprising that the reports of
Ruggles, Dunn, and later Kaysen, generally evoked little response
within the statistical system. To the extent that they expressed con-
cerns regarding the inefficiencies of decentralization they merely
echoed the sentiments of numerous previous reports which had, in the
final analysis, little impact on the organization of the system.
In the respect that the reports were unique -- their recommendations
for some form of computerized data center -- they were not sufficient-
ly relevant (at least in the case of Ruggles and Dunn) to be of in-
terest to most of the agencies. That is, neither Ruggles nor Dunn
specifically discussed the impact of a data center on the organiza-
tional structure of the statistical system. The concept of a data
center had been informally discussed within the statistical communi-
ty for a number of years, and in large measure, these reports were
seen as an extension of those discussions. Until the data center
proposals became sufficiently well defined that they began to encompass
organizational considerations most of the statistical agencies were
far too occupied with other matters to take an active role in the con-
sideration of the issues.
Parenthetically, the Kaysen report did address organizational
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considerations, but at the time of its appearance in October of 1966,
the data center was already a dead issue.3 6 The report thus received
little serious consideration from the statistical community.
The Impact of Computer Technology
Despite the obvious similarities between previous studies and
those of Ruggles, Dunn, and Kaysen with respect to the deficiencies
of a decentralized statistical system, several developments during the
decades of the fifties and sixties did add new dimensions to these
concerns. The first of these was the evolution of computerized data
processing systems.
The federal statistical system, and in particular the Census
Bureau, have long been in the forefront of the development and use
of sophisticated data processing equipment. The first punch cards
for automatic tabulation were developed by Herman Hollerith for use
in the 1890 census. The first practical large scale electronic
data processing (EDP) system evolved from the Univac I which was de-
veloped in the early fifties for use by Census. The Univac program
also resulted in the development of the first practical form of com-
pact machine readable data storage -- magnetic tape.
By the mid-sixties EDP systems were using the third generation
of computers with vastly improved processing speeds, memory sizes,
and storage capacities. Computers found increasing use in the feder-
al statistical system resulting in tremendous increases in efficiency
and reductions in cost in terms of data sorting and tabulation. Pro-
cessing times were reduced drastically -- operations formerly requiring
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months were reduced to weeks or days. The processing of the 1960
population census was reduced from an operation that could have taken
several years to one which only required a few months.
More significant however, was the fact that the increased speed
of computers permitted new types of analysis thatin the past would
have been prohibitively expensive and time consuming. Computers
could edit and check raw data faster and more carefully than was pos-
sible manually, thus greatly improving the quality of final data.
New types of tabulations could be developed. The same basic raw data
could be analyzed in a number of different ways. In the past bodies
of data were collected for use in only one or two specific tabula-
tions which became the final -- and only -- form of the data then
made available to users. The computer made possible the use of the
data for new analytic purposes -- in prat because of the low marginal
costs of furhter processing, and in part because compact storage on
magnetic tape made it practical to retain data for reuse. A single
magnetic tape, for example, could hold the information contained on
over 100,000 punch cards in a fraction of the space. Thus archival
storage of important raw data became practical. In the past, little
information could be kept for long periods as room was needed for the
inflow of new punch cards. The compactness of magentic tape also
made practical the interagency transfer of large amounts of data and
the combining and simultaneous analysis of such data.
The computer also allowed for far more detailed analysis of
data than was previously possible. For example, prior to the intro-
duction of the computer, aggregated tabulations of tax returns were
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used to estimate the impact which proposed changes in the tax law
might have on total tax revenue. With the introduction of the compu-
ter a more detailed analysis was developed. A sample of 100,000 tax
returns was obtained and a computer program developed to recompute
each tax return individually according to the proposed revision of
the law and thus show for the sample not only the cumulative impact
of the taxes but the nature of any income redistributions.
Coincident with the development of increasingly sophisticated
data processing capabilities, the increasing emphasis on social pro-
grams in the sixties generated an enormous new set of data require-
ments for the development, planning, and evaluation of these programs.
Programs dealing with inter alia, poverty, education, health, and
urban organization all required increasingly detailed time series
records on sub system components of the total economy to efficiently
address these issues. Policy makers, as Dunn noted, needed records
"to understand adequately how people, households, regions, activities,
enterprises and administrative units are functionally related and how
they change over time." 3 9
The central problem, which was fundamentally different than
it might have been twenty years ago, was one of records and not data.
That is, in general all the data necessary for the development of these
records was already extant in some part of the federal statistical
system. What was required, as Ruggles, Dunn, and Kaysen noted, was
the integration of this data in a manner that allowed the generation
of the necessary records and analyses. Before the advent of the com-
puter, any such integration and analysis efforts would have been
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prohibitively expensive and time consuming; the more realistic course
at that time was the creation of new data gathering operations directed
at the compilation of the specific records required. The development
of the computer provided the technological capability to rapidly
integrate and process existing data, but there still existed formida-
ble barriers within the statistical system against the effective uti-
lization of that capacity. As noted first by Ruggles and later by
Dunn and Kaysen, the principal problems were:
The Archival Problem. This is the problem that initially in-
terested the Ruggles committee. The problem arises from the fact
that statistical agencies are often oriented to the production
of one or a few particular publications, and they themselves
have little use for the raw data after the completion of their
publications. As a result data that might have been used pro-
fitably by other agencies or users is often destroyed.
In the past old data was destroyed as a matter of neces-
sity to make room for incoming data. But with compact magnetic
tape storage, physical considerations of space are no longer a
concern. And with increasing interest and need in time depen-
dent analyses, the lack of a coherent and consistant policy of
data preservation is a serious problem. There is no adequate
mechanism to insure that agencies are following optimal policies
with respect to the preservation of important information.
Problems of File Maintenance. Even when raw data is saved by
various agencies, it is sometimes so poorly documented as to
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preclude its usefulness for any but its original application.
Again, operating agencies are concerned with achieving the
results necessary for specific tabulations or given computa-
tions. In the course of deriving these results errors are often
discovered regarding transcription or classification of the raw
data. Most frequently these errors are patched on an ad-hoc
basis, but doing so still leaves errors on the original tapes
which are seldom corrected.
In addition, agencies often do not provide sufficient
infotrmation on the layouts, classifications, and definitions
contained in a tape. As a result, even for the agencies' own
purposes it becomes difficult to go back after a few years to
make use of the information unless it happens to be in the same
classification and format employed for current processing.
The Reference Problem. One of the serious problems blocking the
fullest utilization of the existing data in the federal statis-
tical system is the absence of any clearly defined reference
function for identifying the data and its location within the
system. This stems from the decentralized nature of the statis-
tical system and its production orientation. To the extent that
the agencies attempt to provide occasional referencing assistance,
the task usually falls to a single individual whose existence
frequently is not very well known outside the agency itself.
No agency is in a position to perform a reference service
with resnect to the total federal statistical file, and as demand
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for increasingly complex and diverse types of data analysis
frows, this becomes a more severe problem.
The Disclosure Problem. The legal and administrative regula-
tions on the disclosure of information provided by individual
respondents are becoming increasingly restrictive to users.
Much of the data gathered by federal agencies is done so under
the assumption that it will not be released either to outsiders
or other government agencies. Any violation of that understand-
ing would serve to severely jeopardize the continued cooperation
of the agencies' sources. However, researchers rarely require
specific information about respondents per se. The problem arises
from attempts to associate individual sets of data to determine
interesting relationships. The need for identifying individual
respondents in any combining of data files arises not from an in-
terest in individual responses but for the sake of appropriately
matching data at levels of aggregation necessary to create the
statistical analyses required. In other words, to cite a very
simple example, suppose an economist is interested in what
multiple of their yearly income a family will spend on a home,
at various income levels. Further suppose that agency A has a
tape that contains, for all of the people in a given city,
names, addresses and yearly incomes. Agency B has a tape that
has only addresses, names, and values of the homes at those ad-
dresses for the same city. The economist has no interest in
either the values of individual homes or the incomes of particular
38
individuals. Yet the only way he can derive the statistical
sample he wants is to match, at the family level, incomes
with house values. If agencies are restricted by disclosure
rules from providing this type of information to researchers,
or each other, valuable correlations cannot be made.
Problems of File Compatibility. Related to the interagency
utilization of data is the fact that classification and for-
matting schemes vary vastly between different agencies. This
is again the product of the production orientation of the indi-
vidual agencies which results in their tailoring their classi-
fication procedures in a manner that facilitates their production
function. Unfortunately this tends to complicate any inter-
agency use of the data, again, often preventing the fullest
utilization of existing data.
Prior to the development of the computer, interagency
use of data was simply not a consideration. Data was too bulky
and the processing costs too high for it to be used by more
than one agency. But the development of EDP techniques put a
premium on the development of consistant interagency classifica-
tion procedures.
These issues are, in brief, what Ruggles, Dunn, and Kaysen saw
as the major impediments to the realization of the enormous potential
computerized data processing had brought to the federal statistical
system. But agreement on the nature of the problems did not imply agree-
ment on the nature of the solutions.
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The Iational Data. Center
First to address the problems outlined above had been the Social
Science Research Council committee, chaired by Dr. Richard Ruggles of
Yale University, on the Preservation and Use of Economic Data. The
other members of the committee, chosen by Ruggles, were Edwin Kuh
of M.I.T., Stanley Lebergott of Wesleyan University, Guy Orcutt of the
University of Wisconsin, and Joseph Peckman of the Brookings Institute.
The committee's report, submitted in April of 1965 and referred to as
the Ruggles report, in part because of his chairmanship of the commit-
tee and in part because he was the principal contributor, contained
three recommendations, the first and most consequential being the
call for the establishment of a National Data Center.40 Four require-
ments for such a center were outlined.41
The Need for Interagency Authority. The National Data Center
would have the authority to obtain any computer tapes produced
by other federal agencies. The center would obtain duplicate
copies from the agencies of clean, edited tapes, thus both the
center and the agency would have the basic data available. "In
this connection the Federal Data Center should keep track of
statistical projects underway in the federal government and make
sure in advance that the budget for each project includes the
proper provision for making clean, edited tapes and providing
the necessary accompanying information on classification and pro-
granming."
The Need for Computer Facilities. Ruggles saw the data center
as not only furnishing basic information but also, in order to
overcome interagency disclosure problems, performing production
runs of specified analyses for researchers or other federal
agencies (this service would be provided on a reimbursable basis).
The center would necessarily therefore require substantial com-
puter facilities.
The Need for Service Facilities. The data center would act as
more than a repository and production facility. Its role was
described by Ruggles as similar to that of the Library of Congress,
providing systematic and comprehensive coverage of the material
available in its area of competence. It would act to anticipate
user needs so that the most useful information would be preserved
and available in usable form and that unwanted information would
not clog the system.
The Need for Administrative Arrangements. In order for the Nation-
al Data Center to carry out its functions some new administrative
arrangements would need to be made, as no existing agency had the
authority to undertake all the tasks described. No specific
suggestions were made regarding the nature of these arrangements
except to note the limitations of existing agencies as potential
homes for the data center.
The entire proposal was in fact principally a conceptual outline.
Less than two pages of the fifteen-page report were devoted to an over-
view of the center. No mention was made of particular types of institu-
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tional arrangements vis a vis other statistical agencies, the scope
of the data to be contained in the center, or specific operational
procedures to be followed by the center. What did emerge was Ruggles'
philosophy that the key to the realization of the full potential of the
statistical system lay in the centralization and integration to the
maximum possible extent at the micnolevel of all federal statistical
files. That is, if all of the information on micro units (i.e. indivi-
duals, or business establishments, depending on the type of file) now
contained in diverse files throughout the statistical system could be
brought together into a single integrated file, this would vastly
increase the range of analyses that could be performed on this infor-
mation, thereby vastly increasing the utility of the federal statistical
system.
The Ruggles committee, therefore, urged the Bureau of the Budget,
as it had through the Division of Statistical Standards overall respon-
sibility for coordinating the activities of the federal statistical
system, to undertake the steps necessary to establish a National Data
Center. The committee's views were sympathetically reviewed by Charles
Schultze, director of BoB, himself an economist and a professional
acquaintance of Ruggles, and formerly of the Brookings Institute. At
the suggestion then of Schultze's office, Raymond Bowman, director of
the Office of Statistical Standards and a career civil servant, took
the next aetion on the data center proposal by commissioning an acquain-
tance of his, Edgar Dunn, to undertake a further study of the issues.
Another Perspective on the Data Center
Edgar Dunn, at the time he was appointed to review the data
bank proposal, was a consultant with Resources for the Future, a
Wahsington consulting firm. Prior to his position with RFF he had
long been associated with the federal government and the federal sta-
tistical system. His greatest exposure to the problems of that system
came as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs;
that office having had under its jurisdiction the coordination and
review of programs for the Department of the Census and the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. In his position Dr. Dunn was responsible for
the initiation and implementation of several reforms in the statis-
tical operations of those departments.
In his review of the Ruggles report, Dunn essentially agreed
with the problems of the statistical system as outlined. Because of
its greater length (46 pages vs. 15 for the Ruggles report) the re-
view by Dunn was more detailed in its analysis but tended generally
to support the work of Ruggles. Both Dunn and Ruggles favored some
type of centralization of the statistical system to address the is-
sues but differed on its exact nature. The emphasis in the Ruggles
report was clearly on the construction of a central repository for
federal statistical data, but in Dunn's view this failed to take into
account some crucial considerations. While a centralized data repo-
sitory could serve to eliminate interagency disclosure problems,
develop consistant archival policies, provide easier access to data,
etc. -- all important concerns -- the fundamental problem, which was
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not automatically solved by simply bringing the data together, was
that of file compatibility; that is, the standardization of formatting
and classification schemes which would allow the successful integra-
tion of files from different sources. The key to this lies not neces-
sarily in centralization of files but in
1) the development of administrative mechanisms to enforce the
design and maintenance of all statistical files in accordance
with a uniform set of standards, and in
2) the development of a technical system capability which
would allow the reprocessing of these files in the variety of
ways necessary to satisfy user requirements.
In Dunn's words
The effective provision of these services may require the assembly
of some of the records into an integrated file, but this is de-
fined by technical systems requirements and is not the central
issue it is made to be by many representation. 4r
In other words, once system-wide file compatibility was achieved,
there would be, in principle, no need for physical centralization of
data. A central processing facility, when called upon to develop a
particular analysis or tabulation could simply obtain from the rele-
vant agencies the data tapes required for the analysis and return
the tapes on completion. In practice, some sets of data tapes would
be required so frequently that it would be expedient for a central
facility to maintain its own copies. Moreover, some tapes that might
be of historical value to a particular class of users -- but not to
the agency that generated them -- would also be kept in the archival
files of the central facility.
Dunn then went on to argue for the establishment of a National
Data Service Center, the primary function of which would be to pro-
vide service to users of federal statistical data both inside and
outside of government. The center would at the outset be designed
to incorporate some basic functions43
1) To direct the file storage and management for significant
archival records in machine readable form for all participating
agencies -- i.e., Dunn did envision a central repository for some
critical statistical data.
2) To provide a central referral and reference source for the
users of federal statistics.
3) To provide explicit facilitating services for the users of
federal data -- e.g. file rearrangements and cross tabulations,
tape duplications and translations, various forms of file modi-
fications and special tabulations, etc. These services would be
provided for those records under the direct management of the
service center, and for records under the control of agencies
whose operations or facilities did not allow them to adequately
perform these services.
4) To develop computer hardware and software systems essential
to the file management and servicing functions.
5) To provide staff support mecessary to develop the standards
necessary for system operation.
6) A research and analytic capability would be essential to the
success of these functions and would need to be developed at the
center.
The Dunn report went well beyond the Ruggles document in pro-
ceeding to amplify on the scope and cost of some of these functions.
The six functions listed above were classified into three areas and
examined in some detail. First was the reference function. In re-
viewing the requirements for this function it was roughly estimated
that it might take as much as five years to develop, at an annual aver-
age cost of 2 million dollars. It was noted that this figure was
a very crude estimate unsupported by any kind of extensive staff work
that would be essential in a refined program plan.
The second major concern of the service center would be the
collection of a core of statistical data tapes of considerable archi-
val value under the direct control of the center. The question of which
records constituted significant archives rested upon the interpreta-
tions of requirements and standards not yet developed. However,
in order to get some feel for the scope of the problem Dunn asked
Rudolph C. Mendelssohn of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to prepare
a list of records considered to be a vital general purpose series.45
On the basis of Mendelssohn's list, it was estimated that a complete
archive might represent some 20,000 reels of magnetic tape and would
require 3 to 3.5 million dollars to develop over three to five years.
It was further estimated that nearly half of this file, or about
9,000 tapes, could, because of their relatively "clean" state, be
brought directly into the archive for about $260,000 within a year.
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The 9,000 tapes would include Inter alia the 750 reels of the Census
Housing Data, the Census Current Population Data on 375 reels, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey on 43 reels,
the National Income Accounts on 2 reels, IRS tax data on 5,3000 reels,
and Social Security data on 1,900 reels.4
The third area of concern was the service or facilitating func-
tion, that is, the various types of special tabulations and analyses
that the center would perform for users. Again, the report took pains
to note the speculative nature of the cost estimates which it placed
in the neighborhood of 1 to 2 million dollars annually for the first
several years of the center's operation, gradually rising to about
10 million dollars annually in the later years of the center's opera-
tion.4 7
Dunn ended his report with two recommendations for immediate
actions which might be taken under existing authority by the Budget
Bureau:
1) Standards should be developed that would shape the content
of archival records and determine the essential forms of file
maintenance and documentation as part of an on-going program.
A beginning should also be made in formulating the kinds of
standards that would produce statistical building blocks essen-
tial to file compatibility.
2) The 9,000 tape file record identified in the Mendelssohn
report constitutes a nucleus archive that should be generated
quickly at a very modest cost. Funds should be made available
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to the agencies to begin the creation of this basic archival
record.
Dunn's second recommendation proved problematic in a number of
ways. First of all, it tended to obscure the central distinction
between Ruggles' views and his own with respect to the data center.
Dunn had argued throughout his report that the key to realizing the
full potential of the statistical system lay in assurance of file
compatibility, not, as Ruggles had suggested, in massive file contrali-
zation. Yet Dunn's call for the immediate creation of a 9,000 tape
data bank to act as a core for an even larger data center seemed very
much like the massive file centralization Ruggles was advocating.
While no one knew exactly how many data tapes existed throughout the
federal statistical system (estimates had placed it in the range of
30,000),49 9,000 certainly represented a substantial fraction of the
total stock, and an eventual file of 20,000 or more tapes sounded
like much more than a limited archival file.
Dunn later explained that neither the 9,000 nor 20,000 figures
was intended to be taken as anything more than very crude estimates
of what the size of a potential archival file might be. The 9,000
tapes identified for initial centralization were chosen less because
they were presumed to have considerable archival value than because
they were relatively clean, edited tapes which could be brought to-
gether at comparatively low cost. The desire on Dunn's part was to
quickly collect these tapes before they were destroyed by the ori-
ginating agencies, then at some later date review them for their
e0
archival value. This point as Dunn admited was never made clear in
his report, and as a consequence, Dunn came to be identified along
with Ruggles as a proponent of a data center.
What also later proved troublesome was Dunn's observation that
the relatively low cost of this initial file meant it could probably
be developed under existing authority with BoB contingency funds,
which is to say without prior Congressional approval. Not surpri-
singly this proved to be a sore point in the subsequent Congressional
hearings.
As it happened, Congress need not have been concerned that the
Budget Bureau would be busily building up a data center behind its
back. When the Dunn report was submitted to the Office of Statistical
Standards in December of 1965, there was no move to implement either
of Dunn's recommendations for immediate action. For the most part
this was a consequence of the naturally cautious nature of Ray Bowman,
then head of the Office of Statistical Standards. Bowman had displayed
no particular interest in the data center. He had commissioned the
rather small Dunn study (a total cost of less than $12,000)51 at the
suggestion of Charles Schultze's office, but took no part in it and
had not interacted in any significant way with Dunn or Ruggles. Bowman
was also clearly not interested in taking any initiative on what
might be a potentially controvereial issue, and he was aware that the
one statistical agency that had shown any interest in the data center --
the Census Bureau -- was expressing serious reservations as to its
utility. In particular, Morris Hansen, the chief statistician at Census
was voicing his own opposition to a large scale data center.5 Hansen
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felt massive data centralization and integration was both unnecessary
and inefficient. His argument was that the process of matching two or
more statistical files at the micro level, even if all employed the
same classification and formatting schemes, was far from simple.53
It was expensive, time consuming, and involved several important
technical tradeoffs which were not adequately appreciated by Ruggles
and other data bank proponents who had not worked as extensively with
the manipulation of massive data files as had Hansen and other Census
Bureau professionals.
Hansen's opposition might also have been influenced by organiza-
tional considerations. Other federal statistical agencies were un-
willing to show much interest in the data center concept until a
concrete proposal emerged defining the organizational relationships
between it and them. Census, however, was the preeminent statistical
agency and any massive centralization of statistical files not under
its direct control would certainly detract from the Bureau's standing.
It was in these terms that Ruggles saw Hansen's opposition, and it was
for this and other reasons that Ruggles persuaded Charles Schultze to
commission yet a third study of the statistical system.
The Kaysen Report and Its Implications
The Task Force on the Storage of and Access to U.S. Government
Statistics was appointed by Charles Schultze and chaired by Carl Kaysen,
then a professor of political economy and associate dean of the Graduate
School of Public Administration at Harvard. The appointment of the
task force and Dr. Kaysen's chairmanship were, at least partially if
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not primarily, due to the urgings of Dr. Ruggles. Ruggles himself
served on the task force and was the principal author of its report.5
For Ruggles the task force represented an opportunity to both
clarify and gain support for his views against those of Dunn and
Hansen. Not surprisingly then, the Kaysen report strongly recommended
the creation of a National Data Center -- again using Ruggles' ter-
minology -- having the following three principal functions. 5 5
1) The assembling in a single facility of all large scale sys-
tematic bodies of demographic, economic, and social data generated
by the present data collection or administative process of the
federal government.
2) The integration of the data to the maximum feasible extent,
and in such a way as to preserve as much as possible of the origi-
nal information content of the whole body of records.
3) The provision of ready access to the information, within
the laws governing disclosure, to all users in the government
and, where appropriate, to qualified users outside the govern-
ment on suitably compensatory terms.
From an organizational standpoint, the task force suggested
that an entirely new position be created within the executive branch,
that of Director of the Federal Statistical System, with the place-
ment of the Census Bureau and the National Data Center as coordinate
units under his direction. Other federal statistical agencies would
be represented in the director's office through the Federal Statistical
Council which would act as an advisory body to the director as would
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a Public Advisory Council representing interests outside the federal
government. As the new director would exercise coordinating powers
over the federal statistical system, the Office of Statistical Stan-
dards would accordingly be transferred from the Bureau of the Budget
to become a staff office of the new director. The organizational re-
lationships of these elements are shown below.56
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The report was shorter and less detailed than that of Dunn in
setting out what specific kinds of data might be included in the center
and in exact functions it might serve. However, the report's emphasis
on the centralization and integration of all large scale statistical
files places it clearly at odds with the views of Dunn and Hansen.
Moreover, its proposals for restructuring the federal statistical sys-
tem -- with the data center on an equal footing with the Census Bureau --
were surely likely to provoke some opposition from Census.
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As it happened, the Kaysen report received very little response.
By the time it was published in the fall of 1966, the data center was
no longer a viable issue. Nonetheless it is interesting to speculate
on why the report took the position it did in seeking neither to ac-
commodate the technical objections of Dunn or Hansen or to mollify
Census* anxiety over the potential loss of status in the statistical
system. What seems to emerge as the underlying motivation was the
desire on the part of Ruggles and other members of the academic commu-
nity to create within the government a centralized repository of sta-
tistical data that would be responsive primarily to the requirements
of academic users. To maximize the center's responsiveness it would
need to have both substantial data files of its own and the status of
an independent agency. The lack of a substantial data collection,
as would have been the case with Dunn's data service center, and the
consequent dependency of the center on other agencies for data tapes
would have resulted in these agencies inevitably exercising a greater
degree of influence on the center than might have otherwise been pos-
sible. The center might thus become less responsive to the require-
ments of academic users and more concerned with agency issues. Simi-
larly, the incorporation of the data center into any existing agency
with operational responsibilities would have undermined the influence
of the users community with the center. As for the technical argu-
ments presented by Dunn and expressed by Hansen regarding centrali-
zation, they were quite simply ignored by the Kaysen report. The death
of the data center issue prior to the release of the Kaysen report ob-
viated the necessity for a formal dialogue to resolve this question.
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Prior to the Congressional Hearings
Briefly summarizing then, as the data bank issue came before
Congressional scrutiny in mid-1966, it was still a concept very much
in its embrionic stages. Details as to the content and scope of its
activities were far from being developed fully, and the whole activity
involved only a handful of people.
Representing the academic community and arguing for a large
centralized repository of federal statistical data was Richard
Ruggles and a few economists. Contending that only a small archival
repository was required and that emphasis ought to be placed on the
development of a service capability within the statistical system
was Edgar Dunn, an independent consultant and fermerly a member of the
Commerce Department. The distinction between these views tended to
be obscured for a variety of reasons, and both were seen by Congress
and the press as advocates of a national data center.
Within the executive branch of the government the data center
concept in general had the sympathy of Bureau of theBudget director
Charles Schultze, but Schultze was far too occupied with other mat-
ters to lend much active support or pay much attention to the course
of the issue. The director of the Office of Statistical Standards,
Ryamond Bowman, who would have direct responsibility for the develop-
ment and implementation of a concept of this sort, was disinterested
at best. He had on the suggestion of the BoB director's office com-
missioned the Dunn review of the Ruggles report, but apparently paid
little attention to the completed document.
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The only statistical agency to have shown any concern with the
data center concept at this stage was the Census Bureau, where chief
statistician Morris Hansen had expressed serious reservations as to
the utility of a centralized data file.
THE GALLAGHER HEARINGS
The Privacy Issue and the Gallagher Committee
The issues of efficiency and responsiveness that had been the
focus of executive branch discussions of the data center proposal
were replaced in Congressional discussions with concerns over the
invasion of personal privacy. The Congressional interest in per-
sonal privacy had been a long-standing one. In the Senate, the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by Senator Sam Ervin,
had for at least eight years been involved in protecting the privacy
rights of government employees.57 In large measure it was the dis-
closures of this committee and the ensuing publicity, along with
books and articles in the popular press, that had made privacy a
highly visible issue in the mid-sixties.5 Equally conspicuous in
their concern over government intrusions on personal privacy were the
Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations,
chaired by Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher of New Jersey, 5 9 and
the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, led
by Senator Edward V. Long of Missouri.60
The data center question was first taken up by Congress in June
of 1966 when Edgar Dunn testified before the Long Committee. While
somewhat related, the issue was clearly peripheral to the main thrust
of the Subcommittee's investigations which focused on invasions of
privacy through electronic bugging and wiretapping techniques. Dunn
alone testified regarding the data center and his testimony constituted
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CHAPTER IV:
only a few hours out of the set of hearings which went on for five
days. Nonetheless, it was the first Congressional exposure of an is-
sue that had already begun to attract attention in the press.61
The next Congressional action was a series of hearings dealing
exclusively with the data center issue in July of 1966 before Congress-
man Gallagher's Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations.62 Gallagher had recently concluded a series of hearings
on federal agency violations of the privacy rights of potential em-
ployees and had now turned his attention to other issues which ap-
peared to constitute potential invasions of personal privacy by the
government.63 The issue he focused on was what he described as "the
increasing demand for a centralized facility, within the structure of
the national government, into which would be poured information col-
lected from various agencies from which computers could draw selected
facts." Gallagher expressed concern that such a data bank would
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be established "in the interest of economy and efficiency" without
adequate attention being given to the impact it might have on per-
sonal privacy. The examination of that potential impact was set
as the goal of the committee.
The Subcommittee itself consisted of three members, Gallagher,
Congressman Benjamin J. Rosenthal of New York, and Congressman Frank
Horton of New York. It can be safely said that none of the three
were favorably predisposed toward the data center issue. Some com-
ments from Congressman Gallagher's opening remarks were noted above.66
The following two excerpts from their remarks reflect the views of
Rosenthal and Horton respectively:
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My own personal reaction to the proposal for a National Data
Center was, I suppose, similar to that of most citizens --
intense apprehension at the prospect of still more invasions
of personal privacy. In so many areas technological progress
is being secured at the expense of personal liberty. The pro-
jected National Data Center seems an almost too fitting symbol
for that development.67
... there is danger that computers, because they are machines,
will treat us as machines. They can supply the facts and, in
effect, direct us from birth to death. They can "pigeonhole"
us as their tapes decree, selecting, within a narrow range,
the schooling we get, the jobs we work at, the money we earn
and even the girl we marry...It is not enough to say "It 68
can't happen here"; our grandfathers said that about television.
The Witnesses and the Issues
Eight witnesses appeared during the three days of hearings.
First to testify on July 26 was Vance Packard, identified as an author,
sociologist, and lecturer. Mr. Packard's books include "The Hidden
Persuaders," "The Status Seekers," "The Wastemakers," and the "Naked
Society," all dealing in some fashion with individual rights and moti-
vation in a technological society. Testifying after Packard was Charles
Reich, professor of law at Yale University and an expert on the legal
implications of the collection of dossiers.
On July 27, the witnesses for the executive branch, Bowman,
Ruggles, and Dunn, appeared, with Bowman's testimony taking all of the
Committee's morning session while Ruggles and Dunn testified together
during the afternoon session.
On July 28, Paul Baran and Burton Squires, two computer experts
from the Rand Corporation and the University of Illinois, respectively,
discussed the penetrability of computer systems before the Committee.
Following their testimony, Robert R. Gallati, director of the New York
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State Identification and Intelligence System, described the operation
of that system to the Committee.
With the exception of Gallati, whose testimony consisted pri-
marily of a factual description of a system's operation, and the three
executive branch witnesses, the four remaining witnesses called before
the Gallagher Committee were unanimously critical of the data center
proposal. Some of the issues raised during the testimony of these
four men are outlined below.
- One of the major concerns of Packard, Reich, and Congressman
Gallagher was the extent to which the proposed data center consti-
tuted a first step toward a dossier society. As Packard noted,
The trail of records we leave behind us is steadily increasing.
For example, within the government we have birth certificates,
tax returns, the value of homes, locations of our banks, to
some extent the value of our debts, our parents' and children's
income, etc. Units of state government have school records,
grades, IQ, driving records, criminal records, property holdings,
marriage licenses, etc. If we happened to have applied for
credit, or security clearances, the private and government agen-
cies may have records regarding our personality, employment
history, to some extent even appraisals of our social life
and our sex life. Hospitals have medical records and if we
have ever moved, then the moving companies are likely o have
made complete inventories of our personal possessions.6 9
It was also noted that the advent of the computer had made it far
easier to collect and maintain all of these records. More to the
point with respect to a national data center, the computer had made
it easier to centralize all these records, that is, to collect in-
formation from a variety of sources and store it all in one place,
thus providing a complete profile on any one individual. The data
center proposal was seen as an important step toward this type of
centralization and the erosion of personal liberties.
In the first place centralization in itself was seen as an inva-
sion of privacy. Records that, when widely scattered throughout the
government, were not seen as particularly offensive intrusions,
were perceived as real threats to privacy when collected together.
In part this was due to the feeling that there is security in decen-
tralization; developing a profile on an individual is much harder
when information is stored in a number of different places, but
can be had at the touch of a button when stored in a single computer
file. Another important consideration was that the accuracy of the
information tends to deteriorate the further it gets from the origi-
nal source. Raw data which conveys certain information in one
context may when taken out of that context, convey an entirely dif-
ferent message, and in the interests of economy, data centers are
likely only to take a limited amount of information from original
sources without taking much of the vital supporting data. Thus a
man who might have received two or three speeding tickets in his
lifetime or perhaps failed to pay some parking fines may well be shown
to have a criminal record in a data center file without any explana-
tion of the charges. The data center report might be accurate, as
far as it goes, but nonetheless misleading.
- Similarly, there is a tendency to attach far too much authority
to data produced by computer and to fail to question sufficiently
the basis for the information. Reich, for example, focused on many
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of the evaluation forms he was frequently required to fill out on
students seeking jobs or graduate school positions. When and if
his recommendation or evaluation was one of a few items used in making
an evaluation of a candidate, it would be carefully examined, the
candidate given a chance to examine and, if necessary, rebut it, or
Reich himself could be contacted and asked to elaborate or clarify
some points. When it becomes part of a massive central file, there
is a tendency to accept it -- along with everything else -- without
review and without question. Moreover, the whole evaluation process
may be secret, candidates may have no right to review or rebut in-
formation. Most distressing is that in a central file, the informa-
tion -- an unfavorable review or evaluation -- is always there. If
someone is called bad by somebody, then he is still called bad --
in the central file -- 10 years later. In a decentralized system
that particular evaluation may never be sought 10 years after it
is made. But in a centralized file, it is there, it is available,
and therefore it is likely to be used.
- Another consideration frequently raised during the hearings cen-
tered on the extent to which the data center might facilitate the tras-
fer of nominally human decisions and actions to the computer. In
particular, both Packard and Reich as well as Congressman Gallagher
and other congressmen at the hearings had read and commented upon an
article in the Saturday Review of July 23, 1966 by John W. Macy,
chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Macy's article
extolled the virtues of the computer system installed at the Civil
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Service Commission. It glowingly detailed how computers schedule
examinations with respect to time and location, how they grade test
papers, how they print out notifications of test results, stuff
the letters into envelopes and address and mail the envelopes --
all virtually without human intervention. He further discussed
how computers may be used to perform personnel searches finding the
best possible men for given jobs by using the computers "perfect"
memory to pick out the records of government personnel with the
specific characteristics required for the job to be filled.
Mr. Macy was clearly quite pleased with his system. The Committe
made it quite clear it was not. What the Committee saw was neither
cost savings nor efficiency increases that may have accrued from the
installation of computers in the Civil Service, but rather the pro-
gressive dehumanization of the system.
- With its two computer experts the Committee focused on the tech-
nical aspects of the protection of personal privacy in data bank
centers. The two principal issues addressed were:
1) To what extent could software or other internal safeguards
be programmed or built into a data center that would prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of information on individuals? Both
Baran and Squires identified a number of techniques that could
be used to make a system difficult to penetrate. These are,
for example, various types of cryptographic techniques that could
be used to encode the information, as well as programming tech-
niques that would preclude the disclosure of information on
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individuals. There are, moreover, various types of monitoring
programs that can be employed to foil a series of requests
designed to obtain sample sizes small enough to be able to
isolate information on individuals. But in the final analysis,
any reasonably clever programmer with access to the computer
can, with sufficient time, penetrate even the most sophisticated
system.
2) The second method of penetration which concerned the Commit-
tee was access through telephone lines on a distributed (time
sharing or remote terminal) facility. Again all of the above
comments apply. As Baran, who had worked extensively in trying
to develop secure military systems, noted, various kinds of tech-
niques can be employed to make penetration more difficult, but
not impossible. The best, he concluded, that could be done would
be to make it so expensive to penetrate the system that it sim-
ply wouldn't be worth the price for anyone to obtain the infor-
mation.
Briefly, then, these points represented some of the concerns expressed
by the Gallagher Committee during the hearings.
Responses from the Executive Branch
Raymond Bowman, director of the Office of Statistical Standards,
accompanied by Paul Kurger the assistant chief of that office, was
the first member of the executive branch to testify before the Gallagher
Committee. Bowman's introductory remarks before the Committee focused
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primarily on a review of the history of the data center proposal and
the increasing demand for statistical data. Interestingly, Bowman
never strongly endorsed the data center concept; he only pointed out
to the Committee that it did represent a way of improving the storage
of and access to federal statistical data. He also breifly assured
the Committee that a statistical center would not be interested in com-
piling dossiers on individuals, and that privacy could be protected
in such a center using the same sort of administrative procedures
that currently so well served the Census Bureau.
The questions directed at Mr. Bowman were in three general areas,
1) the cost effectiveness of centralization,
2) the nature of the technical and administrative safeguards
regarding the disclosure of information on individuals, and
3) the content for the proposed data center.
With respect to the cost/benefit question, Bowman displayed
some unfamiliarity with the cost estimates prepared by the Dunn group
and admitted to coming unprepared to outline the full range of agen-
cies or groups who might be interested in using the center. He did
describe in general terms how a data center would facilitate the
interagency transfer and utilization of information.
With respect to the disclosure issue, Bowman argued for legis-
lative controls on the disclosure of information from the data center
and heavy legal penalties for violations. This sort of system, he
maintained, had been highly successful in preventing unauthorized
disclosures within the Census Bureau, and he would, therefore, expect
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it to be equally successful for a statistical center. Bowman also
made one noteworthy response to Congressman Gallagher's question
as to why neither the Ruggles report nor the Dunn report contained
any mention of the privacy problem or the disclosure of information
on individuals. In his words, "The only way I can explain this is
that all of us who were working in this area sort of assumed that it
really didn't have to be discussed. In other words, the statisti-
cal system has been so imbued with the notion that you do not reveal
information about the individual -- it didn't get mentioned. I am
very sorry."70 Bowman's view here, shared also by Ruggles and Dunn,
serves to explain a conspicuous absence in those reports of any men-
tion of the privacy issue.
In terms of technical penetration of the system, Bowman main-
tained that the actual makeup of the system had not yet been defined
sufficiently to determine what sort of precautions would have to be
taken to prevent this. What Bowman tried to impress upon the Commit-
tee, with little success, was that the data bank concept was as yet
in no way ready for presentation before Congress as a proposal requir-
ing approval and funding -- and when it finally was, these issues
would be addressed in greater detail.
With regard to the content of the data center, again Bowman
tried to indicate that these questions had not yet been fully resolved,
and it had not been decided what would or would not be contained in
the center. Bowman did indicate that the center would contain only
statistical information and not intelligence records. However, he
was not able to define to the satisfaction of the Committee the dis-
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tinction between these types of records nor did he attempt ot pro-
vide any examples of what specific types of data files would be
included and which excluded. He did not appear, when questioned,
to be familiar with the 9,000-tape initial inventory proposed in the
Dunn report.
Following Bowman, Ruggles and Dunn testified before the Commit-
tee. Ruggles' testimony dealt in large part with explaining to the
Committee the necessity for retaining within a statistical file
individual identification. In other words, why could names or other
identifying numbers not be removed from the data once it was entered
into a file. In the view of many of the congressmen, the failure
to remove these names made a statistical file into an intelligence
file. This is, of course, a very fundamental point which Ruggles
took great pains to explain -- the need for some sort of individual
identifiew was to enable the successful matching of files from differ-
ent sources. For example, if one is to combine in any meaningful
fashion, say IRS and Census data, one must be able to associate
elements from each file for the same individual. While the Committee
was finally willing to accept the necessity for individual identifi-
cation in a statistical file, Congressman Gallagher took pains to
point out the threats this entailed to personal privacy.
Dunn's testimony was more broad ranging, touching on most
of the points covered by Bowman. There were some interesting con-
trasts between their approaches, however. Dunn in his opening state-
ment took pains to distinguish between statistical information sys-
tems and intelligence systems in terms of their output. He then
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turned to the protection of individual data, distinguishing between
administrative and statutory protections and technical protections.
He also considered some types of data which might be included in a
statistical data center.
Elaborating in his testimony on some of these issues, Dunn
pointed out that technical penetration of a statistical system to
obtain individual data would always be possible. However, the ef-
fort involved in penetrating a properly designed system would most
likely be quite prohibitive, and from a potential penetrator's point
of view would probably cause him to look elsewhere to obtain the
data. In terms of administrative safeguards, Dunn like Bowman re-
ferred frequently to the success of the Census Bureau system in
preventing any disclosures of individual information.
Dunn also tried to clarify his position with regard to the
9,000-tape archive suggested in his report. In the view of the
Committee this constituted only the beginning of a much more massive
data file. Dunn tried to emphasize that the 9,000 tapes, suggested
as an initial stock for the center, were tapes which were seen as
having considerable archival value and ought not to be destroyed
without careful review. The tapes did not represent a beginning
for the data center, but were only those tapes which some members of
his staff felt might be destroyed by the agencies which had them,
with an attendant loss of valuable information. The data center
would take charge of these tapes, review them for their archival va-
lue, and then store those which met the center's requirements, destroy-
ing the remainder.
Comments on the Hearings
The most obvious and important observations that can be made
regarding the Gallagher hearings is how they illustrated the dif-
ferent priorities, perspectives, and assumptions which the members
of the executive and legislative branches brought to the evaluation
of the same issue. In the executive branchdiscussions of the data
center concept focused primarily on the extent to which it might
improve the efficiency of federal statistical operations. In the
legislative branch, the overriding concern was with personal priva-
cy. Not one of the witnesses called before the Gallagher Committe,
from outside the executive branch, was asked to offer a view as to
potential improvements in the statistical system that might be
realized by the creation of a data center. What they did comment
on was the variety of ways in which such a center could potentially
violate personal privacy rights.
The executive branch members testifying before Gallagher were
simply unprepared for this preoccupation with personal privacy. Fur-
ther, two major sets of assumptions, implicit in their thinking, but
clearly not in that of Congress, made it difficult to carry on a
meaningful dialogue on the issue. The first of these was that the
disclosure problem in a statistical data center would not be a major
issue. The members of the federal statistical community, including
Ruggles and Dunn, were well acquainted with the effectiveness of the
administrative mechanisms used by the Census Bureau to prevent un-
authorized disclosures of individual information. It was thus assumed
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that similar mechanisms would be employed, and prove equally effec-
tive, in preventing disclosures in a data center. But Congress had
a broader view of the federal bureaucracy -- the record of the Cen-
sus Bureau with respect to the disclosure issue may have been ex-
cellent, but the record of the IRS was abismal. The professionals
in the executive branch may have assumed that the most rigid safe-
guards and the best administrative procedures would be imposed on
the data center. But the members of the Gallagher Committee, with
perhaps less than the highest regard for the caliber of the typical
civil servant, feared that the loosest rules and sloppiest enforce-
ment procedures would come to dominate.
When the executive branch failed to present during the hearings
an extensive, well defined series of measures for the prevention
of unauthorized disclosures from a potential data center, it was
interpreted by Congress as an indication of a lack of serious con-
cern for personal privacy on the part of the data center advocates.
The advocates, for their part, felt that their proposed center was
still at too conceptual a stage to need to address detailed consider-
ations of this sort. The Census example proved that effective me-
chanisms against unauthorized disclosure could be developed, and
when the plans for a data center did become more formalized, it would
only be necessary to adapt these mechanisms to the new center.
The second major assumption underlying the attitude of some
executive branch members toward the privacy issue was the traditional
distinction made in the federal data gathering community between statis-
tical, intelligence, and administrative files. The Orwellian scenarios,
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developed by some members of Congressof computerized men and inti-
mately detailed birth-to-death dossiers stemming from the proposed
center seemed absurd to members of the statistical community who
felt there was a sharp distinction between their records and those of
dossier compiling agencies such as the FBI. Long traditions had
developed to insure the separateness of these types of files and
prevent any significant interchanges of data. The suggestion that
they might in some way be merged in a statistical data center was
anathema to the members of the statistical community. But the dis-
tinction between these types of files was never that clear to Con-
gressman Gallagher and the members of his Committe, and as they lacked
an intuitive grasp of these distinctions, they sought specific exam-
ples of the types of data that would and would not be included in
a statistical center. The failure of the data center advocates to
provide this type of information led Congress and ultimately the pub-
lic to the suspicion that a so-called statistical center was only the
first step toward the total centralization of all government files.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS
Aftermath of the Gallagher Hearings
Reaction to the Gallagher hearings in the press was both sub-
stantial and uniformly critical of the data center proposal. Editor-
ials and articles appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Washington Daily News, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times
Magazine, the Los Angeles Times, and the Providence Journal among others.
Reports also appeared in U.S. News and World Report, The Nation, and
The Nation's Business and in numerous specialized professional jour-
nals and trade publications.71
Only the Wall Street Journal presented an article advocating
the proposal, and that in turn was followed by an editorial arguing
against it.72 Press reaction ranged from attacking the proposed
center as just another phase in the continual erosion of personal
privacy rights in a technological society to bitter attacks on the
concept as the first vital step toward a total police state. In the
Los Angeles Times, Barry Goldwater asserted that the data center would
give the White House police state power7 while the Chicago Sentinel
warned that "the data bank envisaged could become a Gestapo-concept,
furnishing by push-button from coast-to-coast a complete list of all
Zionists, integrationists, pacifists, Seventh Day Adventists, or Roman
Catholics."
Within the Budget Bureau whatever support there may have been
for the data center proposals evaporated under Congressional pressure
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and public criticism. Ray Bowman, never particularly enthusiastic
over the concept, had no intention of defending it any further after
it came under fire. Charles Schultze, who had at least been sympa-
thetic initially, saw little point in pursuing the issue in light of
the Congressional and public responses.
Within the executive office only the Census Bureau had taken
an interest in the proposals, and it had subsequently expressed
strong reservations as to their value. This left only Ruggles, Dunn,
and a handful of economists still supporting the concept, and with
Bowman uninterested and Schultze having dismissed it as politically
unfeasible, they had no organizational entry into the government
through which to pursue the issue in any substantive way. The Kaysen
report, submitted in October of 1966, was tabled, and the entire issue
more or less officially died when in March of 1967, Congressman
Gallagher announced that director Schultze had informed him that no
further action would be taken on the data center proposal until the
consequences and problems of the establishment of such a center could
be fully studied.
During 1967, a second series of hearing on the data center by
Senator Long helped maintain Congressional and public pressure on the
Budget Bureau, insuring that no progress be made on the concept.75
Conclusions
In reviewing the course of the data center proposal, one inter-
esting observation is that the concept suffered the overwhelming re-
jection that it did partly because it was brought under public and
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Congressional scrutiny long before it was ready for such appraisal.
If its advocates in the executive branch had had perhaps another year
to examine the issue, they might have been able to resolve some of the
finer internal points of the proposal and present to the Congress a
unified, well supported concept. Additional time might also have
allowed for a better preparation of the strategy to be used in approach-
ing Congress with a data bank proposal given public attitudes towards
such a concept. The testimony before Gallagher by executive branch
officials and the Dunn, Ruggles, and later Kaysen reports, all focused
primarily on the data center as a means to improve government effi-
ciency. Very little consideration was given toward presenting this
proposal in some form that would allay public concern over the pri-
vacy issue. The distinction between statistical and intelligence
systems was never forcefully enough drawn in any of the presenta-
tions. In the Dunn and Ruggles reports, this is understandable; they
were intended for use only by the in-group which implicitly made such
distinctions and had a high regard for the privacy issue as a matter
of course. But in the Gallagher hearings the privacy issue was badly
mishandled. Rather than assuring Congress and the public that any
establishment of such a center would be contingent on the develop-
ment of adequate privacy safeguards and that assessing the privacy
implications of a proposed center would be matters of the highest pri-
ority, the executive branch representatives chose instead to try to
defend a concept which had not yet been fully developed.
Of course, whether the executive branch, given more time, would
indeed have focused more attention on the privacy issue is itself in
73
question. There are sound reasons for speculating both ways. The
effectiveness of the Census system for preventing unauthorized dis-
closures and the traditional distinctions between statistical and
intelligence data files that were implicit in the thinking of the data
center proponents might have resulted in a continued omission of
detailed considerations of the privacy question. The Kaysen report,
for example, considered the privacy question in a brief two-page ap-
pendix written only after the Gallagher hearings. On the other hand,
the Census Bureau was becoming increasingly aware of the privacy
question surrounding statistical data as Congress began to focus its
scrutiny on the content of the census questionaires. Had Census
and the data center proponents been able to resolve their differences,
there is the possibility that the Bureau would have sensitized them
to these issues.
But even had the executive branch taken a better approach with
the Commitee than it did, there is doubt as to whether any data center
proposal could have survived the attack of a Congressional committee
such as Gallagher's. If the press is any reflection of popular senti-
ment, a great many people felt as Gallagher did that centralization
was in itself undesirable, that a centralized data bank, no matter
how well protected, offered the government too much temptation to
misuse it. Neither legal nor technical safeguards were failsafe and
the centralization of files eliminated one of the best safeguards of
personal privacy -- the bureaucracy. No matter how carefully it was
explained, the centralized data file would still be, in the minds of
many, just one step away from a personal dossier bank, an indelible
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birth-to-death record of our lives whose very existence was in some
way an affront to human dignity.
Against these sentiments the proponents of the data center could
only argue that it would improve the efficiency of government statis-
tical operations. However desirable such a goal might have been,
it certainly carried less emotional impact than the images of "big
brother" in Washington, raised by opponents of the proposal. Disas-
sociating the "big brother" image from the statistical data center
would probably have proven too great a task for the center's advocates.
Even if the public and Congress could be persuaded that the initial
data stored in such a facility was of a non-sensitive nature, the
very existence of the center would be a temptation to fill it with
progressively more sensitive information -- all in the name of ef-
ficiency -- until it did, in fact, come to be a dossier file. The
statistical community believed that the long standing traditions against
mixing intelligence and statistical data would prevent this, but
neither the public nor Congress was intimately acquainted with these
traditions. Perhaps more important, the statistical community itself
failed to consider how these traditions might change when adapted
to the new structure of a centralized system.
In the final analysis, therefore, even more time, greater unity
in the executive branch, and a better presentation to Congress and the
public would not have won approval for the data center given the attitudes
to personal privacy prevalent at the time.
As a final note, I began this study to investigate what seemed
to me as one of the earliest technology assessments. As it happened
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there were no real technical questions of consequence in dispute.
There was a general agreement that a computerized data center could
indeed improve the efficiency of the statistical system. There was
also a general aggrement that any such system could be technically
penetrated. But the real issue was balancing efficiency and the
threat to personal privacy. This was not a technical problem but a
political one. A proven technology had both a positive and negative
potential. Through the political process it was decided that the
latter outweighed the former and the technology was never implemented.
In light of the current discussions on technological imperatives and
the inevitability of technological progress, this stands as an inter-
esting counterpoint.
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